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I

FIRST GOT TO KNOW JACK GRUNAWALT when I participated in some
of the symposia he organized at the Naval War College. I soon realised that
he was a great organizer, full of enthusiasm, and possessed of a warm
personality. In my two years as Stockton Professor ofInternational Law at the
College, I have come to value him as a colleague and friend-and almost as the
father of a small family of fellow workers.
As a former British Army officer with a somewhat restricted knowledge of
maritime law, I had some fears associated with being in an Oceans Law and
Policy Department. But Jack made me welcome and integrated me into his
team. It did not take me long to realise that here was a man with catholic
interests willing to listen to another's views, even though they might be radical
and perhaps even "revolutionary." Discussing one's views with him would
often result in a modification of one's radicalism, and certainly a clarification of
doubt. It soon became clear that Jack's views and interests were wide in the
extreme, and he was obviously prepared to share them.
Having heard Jack lecture and seen his rapport with a class of officers from a
variety of commands and countries, I soon recognised that he i~ a born teacher.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

The Law of War
Jack is also very modest. Soon after I joined the College, he told me that he did
not consider himself a true professor since he had never held an academic
appointment. I reminded him that he held a professorial appointment at a
recognized and highly respected institute of specialized and higher learning and
that having watched him in action, I know that he is more than adequately
entitled to be addressed as Professor.
It is with great delight that I find myself among those of his amici
contributing to this Liber Amicorum in honour of Jack Grunawalt.
It has often been claimed that modem international law is Eurocentric in
character. This somewhat chauvinistic attitude is frequently based on
comments in the works of the "fathers" of international law, many of whom
were Christian monks. l It is a view strengthened by pointing out that" [t] he era
of the independent territorial State began in earnest with the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and the political
hegemony asserted by the Roman Catholic Church."z Such an attitude,
however, tends to minimize the significance of the system that prevailed in
ancient and medieval times. From earliest times it had been recognized that
some restraints were necessary during armed conflict. Thus, we find numerous
references in the Old Testament wherein God imposes limitations on the
warlike activities of the Israelites. It is true that the Israelites were frequently
enjoined to slaughter all the inhabitants of the cities they captured,3 but this
was only when the war was waged at the direct instruction of God and normally
against heathens who rejected Him; to show mercy to the enemy would
constitute a sin against the Lord.4 The Prophets tell us that in other wars the
victorious Israelites made the inhabitants of conquered territories slaves unless
they paid tribute. 5 If peace was not accepted upon defeat, the males were to be
slain, while women and children were to be spared, but made slaves. The rabbis
modified this so that their status became that of servants rather than slaves.
Prisoners of war were to be treated humanely and not slain, as Elisha
informed his king when asked if he might kill them. 6 In the days of the kingdom,
this was the common practice, for "if thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to
eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink."7 Not only were the innocent
to be protected, but precautions were also to be taken not to harm the local
fauna and flora, subject to the needs of military necessity. Thus, soldiers were
told not to destroy trees or fruit, other than that which was required for food or
the building of defenses.8 Josephus9 interpreted this to mean that the land was
not to be set on fire nor beasts of burden slaughtered. lo In fact, commenting on
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Jewish behavior during conflict in biblical times, one commentator has
remarked:
The rabbis ll softened the impact of much of the old law through
reinterpretation or imaginative explanation. Due to this it seems that the
Israelites were indeed a "merciful" people when compared with their neighbours,
such as the Assyrians. Although, as in any case, exceptions and violations to
regulations occurred, on the whole, the Israelite warriors conducted themselves
in a disciplined, restricted manner in accordance with rules and regulations
derived from divine inspirationY

It must be borne in mind, however, that, for the main part, the penalty for
disregarding the imprecations concerning conduct in combat were punishable
only by religious, that is to say divine, sanction.
The Israelites were not the only ancient people to consider it necessary to
impose some measure of control on their warlike activities. Sun Tzu
maintained that in war one should only attack the enemy armies, for "the worst
policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."13 As
early as the seventeenth century B.C., the Chinese, when resorting to war,
limited their activities by a conscious application of principles of chivalry.14
This may be seen in the refusal of the Duke of Sung's minister of war to attack
an unready enemy, while it was "deemed unchivalrous among Chinese chariot
aristocrats [to take] advantage of a fleeing enemy who was having trouble with
his chariot (he might even be assisted), [to] injure a ruler, [or to] attack an
enemy state when it was mourning a ruler or was divided by internal troubles."
The sacred writings of ancient India equally sought to introduce some
measure of humanitarianism. The Mahabharata 1S states that "a king should
never do such an injury to his foe as would rankle the latter's heart, no sleeping
enemy should be attacked, and with death our enmity is terminated.,,16 The
Laws of Manu, promulgated at approximately the same period, postulate that:
when the king fights his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed,
nor with barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazed with fire .... These
are the weapons of the wicked. 17

Moreover, it was generally recognized that proportionality between the
combatants was a requirement, so that elephants should be used only against
elephants, in the same way as foot soldiers would fight against foot soldiers. 18
Similarly, the Ramayana19 condemned weapons which could "destroy the entire
race of the enemy, including those which could not bear arms ... because such
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destruction en masse was forbidden by the ancient laws of war, even though
[the enemy] was fighting an unjust war with an unrighteous objective."zo The
Mahabharata, too, forbade the use of "hyperdestructive" weapons, since these
were "not even moral, let alone in conformity with religion or the recognized
rules of warfare." Z1
In ancient Greece, among the city States:
[T] emples and priests and embassies were considered inviolable.... Mercy ...
was shown to helpless captives. Prisoners were ransomed and exchanged.
Safe-conducts were granted and respected. Truces and armistices were
established and, for the most part, faithfully observed.... Burial of the dead was
permitted; and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious to
cut off the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisoned weapons,zz
Treacherous stratagems of every description were condemned as being contrary
to civilized warfare. 23
In so far as Rome was concerned, practices:
[V] aried according as their wars were commenced to exact vengeance for gross
violations of international law, or for deliberate acts of treachery. Their warlike
usa"ges varied also according as their adversaries were regular enemies . . . or
uncivilized barbarians and bands of pirates and marauders .... [T]he belligerent
operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various mitigations in
the field, and adopting a milder policy after victory, are distinctly of a progressive
character. They were more regular and disciplined than those of any other
ancient nation. . . . The ius belli imposed restrictions on barbarism, and
condemned all acts of treachery.... [Livy tells us] there were laws of war as well
as peace, and the Romans had learnt to put them into practice not less justly than
bravely. . . . The Romans [says Ciceroz4] refuse to countenance a criminal
attempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor.25
The rules of war in both Greece and Rome were, indeed:
[A]pplicable only to civilized sovereign States, properly organized, and enjoying
a regular constitution; and not to conglomerations ofindividuals living together
in an irregular and precarious association. Rome did not regard as being within
the comity of nations such fortuitous gatheri~gs of people, but only those who
were organized on a civilized basis, and governed with a view to the general good,
by a properly constructed system of law.... Hence barbarians, savage tribes,
bands of robbers and pirates, and the like were debarred from the benefits and
relaxations established by international law and custom.... [A]s to the general
practice of war in Hellas, we find remarkable oscillations of warlike policy. Brutal
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treatment and noble generous conduct are manifested at the same epoch, in the
same war, and apparently under similar circumstances. At times we hear of
proceedings which testify to the intellectual and artistic temperament of the
Greeks; at other times, we read narratives which emphasize the fundamental
cruelty and disregard of human claims prevalent among the ancient races when
at war with each other. In Homer ... hostilities for the most part assumed the
form of indiscriminate brigandage, and were but rarely conducted with a view to
achieving regular conquests, and extending the territory of the victorious
community. Extermination rather than subjection of the enemy was the usual
practice.... Sometimes prisoners were sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated,
and mercy refused to children, and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts
of mercy and nobility were frequent.... The adoption of certain, cowardly,
inhuman practices ... was condemned .... In reference to the conduct of war in
Greece, it is important to remember that it was between small States, whose
subjects were to an extraordinary degree animated by patriotism and devotion to
their mother-country, that each individual was much more affected by hostilities
than are the cities of the large modem States, that every individual was a
soldier-politician who saw his home, his life, his family, his gods at stake, and,
finally, that he regarded each and every subject of the opposing State as his
personal adversary.26

It has been pointed out that the situation in ancient Greece appears to have
changed somewhat after Homer's time and that by the fifth century B.C., both
Euripides27 and Thucydides28 were able to write of the "common customs
(koina nomima) of the Hellenes," which, in regard to the law of war, may be
summarized as follows:
1. The state of war should be officially declared before commencing
hostilities against an appropriate foe; sworn treaties and alliances should be
regarded as binding.
2. Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate; sacred truces, especially
those declared for the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed.
3. Hostilities against certain persons and in certain places are
inappropriate; the inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of
the gods, especially heralds and suppliants, should be respected.
4. Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies
should be respected.
5. After a battle it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to
request the return of one's dead is tantamount to admitting defeat.
6. A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance
of the challenge.

43

The Law of War
7. Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom rather than being
summarily executed or mutilated.
8. Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained.
9. War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be
primary targets of attack.
10. Battles should be fought during the usual (summer) campaigning
season.
11. Use of nonhoplite29 arms should be limited.
12. Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in
duration. 3o
By the time of the wars with Persia, the Peloponnesian War, and the changes in
the nature of Greek life, these rules were no longer of general validity.31
As to the situation in Rome, and as a commentary upon the effects of its
practices, it has been suggested that
[T]he conduct of war [in Rome] was essentially unrestrained. Prisoners could be
enslaved or massacred; plunder was general; and no distinction was recognized
between combatants and noncombatants. Classical Latin, indeed, lacked even
a word for a civilian. The merciless savagery of Roman war in this sense carried
on into the invasion period of the fifth and sixth centuries.... In practice
[,however,] Roman war was not always so savage. But such was the
understanding of Roman war with which medieval theorists of war worked, and
they erected bellum Romanum in this sense into a category of warfare which
permitted the indiscriminate slaughter or enslavement of entire populations
without distinction between combatant and noncombatant status. This was a
style of warfare appropriate only against a non-Roman enemy, and in the
Middle Ages this came to mean that Christians ought only employ it against
pagans... .'132

In line with the practices described in the Old Testament, similar principles
applied in the Islamic world. The Caliph Abu Bakr commanded his forces "let
there be no perfidy, no falsehood in your treaties with the enemy, be faithful to
all things, proving yourselves upright and noble and maintaining your word and
promises truly.'133 Similarly, the leading Islamic statement on the law of nations
written in the ninth century forbids the killing of women, children and the old
or blind, the crippled and the helplessly insane. 34 Moreover, during combat,
"Muslims were under legal obligations to respect the rights of non-Muslims,
both combatants and civilians.... [T]he prisoner of war should not be killed,
but he may be ransomed or set free by grace.,,35 However, if it was considered
that his death would be advantageous to the Muslims, he might be killed,
unless he converted to Islam. Unlike the Old Testament ban on destruction of
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the land and its products, Islam permitted the inundation or burning of a city,
even though protected persons, including Muslims, might thus be killed.36
During the Middle Ages, rules of chivalry applied as between the orders of
knighthood, although these did not operate to protect the foot soldiers or the
yeomenry. By the middle of the fifteenth century, a sufficient number of works
were being written on the rules of chivalry as to make it possible to say that:
[B]y the 14'h century, medieval Christendom had developed a law of arms, the jus
militare, well understood and applied by the military and feudal jurisdictions of
Western Europe. The theoretical bases of that law followed the medieval legal
and theological theories of the hierarchy of legal systems, namely, the Law of
God, the eternal law; the law of nature; the jus gentium, its more practical
counterpart; and human positive law.... The jus militare which governed the
conduct of the members of the honourable profession of arms was considered a
part of the jus gentium, being part of the customs of those who were professional
men-at-arms and members of the Orders of chivalry where the standards of
Christian and military behaviour were meant to meet.... The jus militare being
seen as a part of the jus gentium, the practical legal consequences followed that it
was a body of rules understood and applied throughout the length and breadth of
Christendom, then subject to the divided regimes of sacerdotium and imperium, of
papacy and emperor. The heralds and older knights were considered periti in the
law of arms, while writers such as ... Christine de Pis an, a woman writer whose
work Uvre des Fays d'Armes et de Chivalerie (1407) ... [were] regarded as
authorities and cited in the jurisdictions where the law of arms was applied. 37 In
the Councils of Princes, in military and feudal courts, learned canonists argued
with erudition and skill the complex matters arising out of warfare before the
experienced knights who composed the military jurisdictions. In cases of
difficulty, the heralds were consulted as the repositories oflearning on the law of
arms.
These cases were often concerned with claims to ransom, to booty and spoils,
rather than with the enforcement of honourable conduct in warfare .... So far as
trials of soldiers in enemy allegiance were concerned, we see a universality of
jurisdiction which is not easy to explain. Doubtless the close nexus of the law of
arms with the jus gentium went part of the way to explain this .... The military
calling is seen as a jealous and exclusive one, intimately associated with the
concept of honour.... The bearing of arms is so much a matter of honour that
those who do not bear arms are without honour; it is a matter of honour to be
allowed to bear arms .... [W]hat we would today call criminal conduct in warfare
was seen as a violation of that honour upon which the right to bear arms was
based. A medieval war crime is a breach of the law of arms,38 it is more specifically
an act contra fidem et jus gentium . ... Honour is the root of the law of arms. Those
who commit acts of dishonour act contrary to the faith and honour of a knight.
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The law of arms controls and regulates acts of warfare by the professional and
chivalric military classes. We can also discern a universality of jurisdiction to
entertain such allegations of dishonourable acts in warfare. The law of arms
being the measure of such honour binds all those who follow the profession of
arms in Christendom and at all places where Christians perform feats of arms.
The jus gentium of which the law of arms formed part has given us the legacy of
universal jurisdiction over war criminality.39

As with ancient India, the orders of knighthood condemned the use of
certain weapons, especially those which were not employed in hand,to,hand
encounters between the knights themselves, but which enabled a man not of
noble birth to strike a knight from a distance. In condemnation of such
weapons, the knights found support from the Church. The second Lateran
Council in 1139 condemned40 the use of the arc and crossbow41 as hateful to
God, a view coinciding with the concepts of chivalry,42 which regarded
weapons that could be fired from a distance by a person not a member of the
profession of arms and out of the potential reach of the intended victim as a
disgraceful and improper act. The third Lateran Council reiterated its
anathemization of these weapons, and in 1500 the Corpus Juris Canonicct3
forbade the use of arrows, darts, or catapults, leading Belli to comment that this
was done "in order to reduce as far as possible the number of engines of
destruction and death." However, "regard is so far lacking for this rule that
firearms of a thousand kinds are the most common and popular implements of
war; as if too few avenues of death had been discovered in the course of
centuries, had not the generation of our fathers, rivaling God with his
lightning, invented this means whereby, even at a single discharge, men are
sent to perdition by the hundreds."44
Both Belli's comment and the ideas underlying the approach of the
canonists, as well as the concepts of the Peace and Truce of God, have much in
common with the condemnation by Erasmus of the manner in which the
medieval knight decked himself for war:
Do you think Nature would recognize the work of her own hand-the image of
God? And if anyone were to assure her that it were so, would she not break out in
execrations at the flagitious actions of her favourite creature? Would she not say
when she saw man thus armed against man, "What new sight do I behold? Hell
itself must have produced this portentous spectacle.... I would bid this wretched
creature behold himself in a mirror, if his eyes were capable of seeing himself
when his mind is no more. Nevertheless, thou depraved animal, look at thyself, if
thou canst; reflect on thyself, thou frantic warrior, ifby any means thou mayest
recover thy lost reason, and be restored to thy pristine nature. Take the looking
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glass, and inspect it. How come that threatening crest of plumes upon thy head?
Did I give thee feathers! Whence that shining helmet? Whence those sharp
points, which appear like horns of steel? Whence are thy hands and feet
furnished with sharp prickles? Whence those scales, like the scales of fish, upon
thy body? Whence those brazen teeth? Whence those plates of brass all over
thee? Whence those deadly weapons of offence? Whence that voice, uttering
sounds of rage more horrible than the inarticulate noise of the wild beasts?
Whence the whole form of thy countenance and person distorted by furious
passions, more than brutal? Whence that thunder and lightning which I perceive
around thee, at once more frightful than the thunder of heaven, and more
destructive to man? I formed thee an animal a little lower than the angels, a
partaker of divinity; how camest thou to think of transforming thyself into a beast
so savage, that no beast hereafter can be deemed a beast, if it be compared with
man, originally the image of God, the Lord of Creation? "45
As to the role of the canonists in the development of the law of armed
conflict, reference should be made to the Peace of God and Truce of God
movements. It was apparently the violence of the milites raised by feudal lords
which:
[F]irst experienced the impetus to restrain violence in the Middle Ages. That
impetus was the Peace of God movement, whose initial target was precisely the
bullying milites and those bands of armed men who lived on the edges of
civilization, preying on settled areas. The Peace of God idea originally appeared
late in the tenth century; about a generation later came the first appearance of a
concept generally attached to it in historical interpretation, the Truce of God,
and a century after that, in 1139, following the ban on crossbows, bows and
arrows and siege weapons issued by the Second Lateran Council. This last was
directed principally at mercenaries, who often were organized into fighting units
around one or the other of these highly specialized and destructive weapons ....
The beginnings of the Peace of God can be identified at the time of the Council
of Le Puy in 975 ... imposing on the milites an oath 'to respect the Church's
possessions and those of the peasants'-provisions that were ultimately to
become the core of the idea of noncombatant immunity in late-medieval just war
tradition.... The subsequent idea of the Peace of God ... gradually diminished
the protection extended to peasants and their property while making more
explicit the immunity of ecclesiastical persons and property.... In the next
landmark statement of canon law on this subject, that in the thirteenth century
De Treuga et Pace, peasants, their goods, and their lands had returned to the
category of those who did not participate in war and thus should not have war
made against them. Gradually, other non-Churchly categories of persons were
added to the list of noncombatants, until by the time of Honore Bonet's L'Arbre
des Batailles in the fourteenth century the listing had come to include all sorts of
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secular persons who were noncombatants by virtue of not being knights ... or
not being physically able to bear arms .... Peasants and clergy alike were defined
in the former way, while such noncombatant groups as women, children, the
aged, and the infirm belonged to the latter category..•. In the shorter run, the
effect of the Peace of God was not so much to protect peaceful noncombatants ... ,
but to mark off who might legitimately resort to arms and for what end.... [I]n
the long run, the idea of noncombatant immunity contained within the Peace of
God developed into a much more universal concept with far,reaching
implications. This is one of the ... core ideas around which the jus in bello of just
war tradition developed, and modem humanitarian law of war and moral
argument centering on the concept of discrimination are legacies of this slender
tenth,century beginning.... While the Peace of God aimed at protecting certain
kinds of person and their property . . . the Truce of God [beginning with the
Council ofToulouges in 1027] aimed instead to eradicate the use of arms entirely
during certain periods [-namely the Sabbath, and such holy days as Christmas
and Lent-] .... Still, the Truce of God applied only among Christians, and this
meant that violence could still be employed by Christians against non, Christians
during truce periods. In practice this meant that violence could be directed
against two main groups: infidels, as in the Crusades; and heretics, as in religious
persecution.... How did the ban on crossbows, bows and arrows, and siege
weap.ons contribute to [limiting violence]? ... By the twelfth century the typical
mercenary belonged to a well, organized band whose leader sold or bartered their
services as a group and then paid his followers. 46 This was the condottori pattern,
which reached its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. . . . In the
Middle Ages, what held these bands together ... was expertise in one or another
weapon that could be especially telling in the prevailing kind of warfare.
Specifically mercenary companies were formed around the possession and skilled
use of bows and arrows and crossbows, neither of which were employed by
knights but which could be devastating when used against knights, and siege
machines, these being so expensive and difficult to transport and requiring so
much skill to use properly that wealthy nobles preferred not to own their own but
hire mercenary companies specializing in their use. From this it follows easily that
the new,style mercenaries could be controlled by constraints placed on the use of
their weapons. The knightly class in particular had good reason to favor such
restraints, since there was no glory in falling in battle to an arrow shot by a
commoner and since siege weapons represented the only significant threat to a
nobleman seeking security from attack in his castle...."47

The feudal knights were fully aware of the existence of what they knew as
the "law of chivalry" or of arrns,48 which regulated their affairs and which was
enforced by a variety of Courts of Chivalry49 or specially appointed tribunals.
Thus, in 1474, representatives of the Hanseatic cities tried Peter of Hagenbach
at Breisach50 for administering occupied territories in a fashion "contrary to the
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laws of God and of man." His plea that he was only carrying out the orders of his
prince was rejected and he was executed.
Since foot soldiers were not regarded as members of the honorable
profession of arms, the rules of chivalry did not apply to them. However, even
they were not free to pursue their own fashion of fighting, for this was regulated
by national codes of arms which could be enforced by commanders exercising
"rights of justice." Among the earliest of such codes was the "Articles of War"
promulgated by Richard II in 1385. This forbade, on pain of death, any robbery
or pillage of a church or an attack on a churchman, as well as "forcing" any
woman. It also recognized the right of a captor to take his prisoner's parole,
although:
[I]f anyone shall take a prisoner, as soon as he comes to the army, he shall
bring him to his captain or master on pain oflosing his part [of the captive's
property] ... j and that his said captain or master shall bring him to our lord the
King, constable or marschall, as soon as he well can, ... in order that they may
examine him concerning news and intelligence of the enemy... ."51

This indicates that war was no longer construed as a conflict between
individual and individual, but between organized forces with prisoners no
longer in a master,and,servant relationship with their captors, but instead,
considered as the "property" of the ruler under whose auspices the captor was
fighting.
Perhaps more significant from our point of view, and foretelling much of the
present law, were the "Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the
Warres" promulgated by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1621.
Art. 85. He that forceth any woman to abuse her, and the matter bee proved, he
shall die for it.
Art. 88. No souldier shall set fire upon any Towne or Village in the enemies'
Land, without he be commanded by his Captain: neither shall any Captain give
any such command unless he hath first received it from us or our General: who so
doth the contrary, he shall answer it in the Generals Councell ofWarre....
Art. 92. They that pillage or steal either in our Land or in the enemies, ...
without leave, shall be punish'd as for other theft.
Art. 94. If any man give himselfe to fall upon the pillage before leave be given him
so to doe, then may any of his Officers kill him....
49

The Law of War
Art. 96. No man shall presume to pillage any Church or Hospitall, although the
Strength be taken by assault; except he be first commanded, or that the Souldiers
and Burgers be fled thereinto and doe harm, from thence; who dares the
contrary, shall be punished....
Art. 97. No man shall set fire upon any Hospitall, Church, Schoole, or Mill, or
spoyle them in any way, except he be commanded; neither shall any tyrannize
any Churchman, or aged people, men or women, maides or children, unless they
first take up arms against them, under paine of punishment....
Art. 98. No souldier shall abuse any Churches, Colledges, Schooles or
Hospitalls; ... no souldier shall give any disturbance to any person exercising his
sacred function or Ministery, upon paine of death.
Art. 113. Our Commanders shall defend the countrey-people and Ploughmen
that follow their husbandry, and shall suffer none to hinder them in it.
Art. 116. Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is repugnant to
Military Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent countrey may against
all right and reason be burdened withall, whatsoever offence finally shall be
committed against these orders, that shall the severall Commanders make good,
or see severally punished unlesse themselves will stand bound to give further
satisfaction.52

In 1639 England had a full system of Laws and Ordinances of WaITe53
regulating the behavior of forces in the field, forbidding, among other things,
marauding of the countryside, individual acts against the enemy unauthorized
by a superior, private taking or keeping of booty, or private detention of an
enemy prisoner. Similar codes existed in Germany and Switzerland. 54 To some
extent, these codes reflected the principles to be found in various writings on
military matters and the law of war, including, for example, those of Ayala, De
Jure et Officiis et Disciplina Militari, 1582; Belli, De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus,
1663; Gentili, De]ure Belli, 1612; Legnano, De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello,
1447; and even Grotius, whose seminal work, De Jure ac Pacis, 1625, is
frequently treated as if it were the fountainhead of all knowledge on the
then-existing intemationallaw. In the latter work, Grotius emphasizes that war
was the normal order of the day. All these to some extent reflected earlier
works devoted to the Loi des Batailles, and nearly all claimed to be declaring the
law that armies were obliged to follow. In many cases, they were mere
abstractions based on existing practice, and it is noticeable how much
agreement there is across the whole spectrum. These principles drawn from
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practice and doctrine are expressive of the customs of war and, to a great
extent, constitute what are now known as the customary law of armed conflict.
Of the codes it has been said that, combined with the customary rules, they
form "Ie meilleur frein pratique pour imposer aux armees Ie respect d'un modus
legitimus de mener les guerres."ss
As has been mentioned, the principles of chivalry were of universal
application and they frequently confirmed the immunity from attack or
capture of hospital staff, chaplains, doctors, surgeons or apothecaries.
However, while Belli, basing himself on the writings of Bartolus in the
fourteenth century, asserted that during war the "persons of doctors may not be
seized, and they may not be haled to court or otherwise harassed, [and]
attendants may not search them for the carrying of arms,,,S6 there was no
general recognition of this. To a large extent it depended on the discretion of a
commander whether medical personnel accompanied his forces and often the
only one would be his personal physician. However, Gustavus Adolphus had
four surgeons attached to his regiments and the Armada too carried medical
personnel, but these only looked after their own. By a decree of Louis XIV of
1708, a permanent medical service was established "a la suite des armees et
dans les places de guerre."S7 Even before this, during the siege of Metz in
1552,3, Fran~ois de Guise had summoned the French surgeon Para "to succour
the abandoned wounded soldiers of the enemy and to make arrangements for
their transport back to their army."SB
By the end of the seventeenth century, occasional agreements were being
drawn up between rival commanders for mutual respect towards the wounded
and hospitals. A fairly sophisticated agreement of this kind was entered into
between the French and English at L'Ecluse in 1759, whereby:
I

[H]ospital staff, chaplains, doctors, surgeons and apothecaries were not ... to be
taken prisoners; and, if they should happen to be apprehended within the lines of
the enemy, they were to be sent back immediately. The wounded of the enemy
who should fall into the hands of the opponents were to be cared for.... They
were not to be made prisoner and might stay in hospital safely under guard.
Surgeons and servants might be sent to them under the general's passport.... ,,59

Some twenty years later, in 1780, Peyrilhe proposed international
recognition of the principle that the wounded should not be made prisoners of
war nor enter into the balance of exchanges.6o However, it was not until after
the experiences of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea and the publication of
Henri Dunant's Souvenir de Solferino in 1862, reporting on the horrors he had
witnessed at that battle, that Peyrilhe's proposal came to fru~tion, with the
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establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 186361 and
the adoption in 1864 of the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded of Armies in the Field.62
Apart from arrangements and developments of this kind, other customs
were evolving. During the Hundred Years War, guerre mortale, war to the
death, was distinguished from bellum hostile, a war between Christian princes
when prisoners could still ransom themselves, guerre guerriable, fought in
accordance with the feudal rules of chivalry, and the truce, which included a
temporary cessation of hostilities during which the wounded and dead might be
collected, with the resumption of hostilities follOwing a truce considered a
continuation of an ongoing conflict, rather than the opening of a new one.
Each had its own rules, but they were rules of honor.
In medieval and later European wars, the capture of cities was of major
importance and could be effected by surrender or siege and assault. If by
agreement, the inhabitants were treated in accordance with its terms, but if by
assault, there were no legal restrictions, although churchmen, women and
children were frequently spared. Siege required peculiar weapons, both
offensive and defensive,63 but as sieges became less frequent and these weapons
of less value, they tended to fall into desuetude and came to be considered
illegal,64 only to be replaced by weapons more suited to the newer methods of
warfare.
These developments were in line with others which had ensued by the time
of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia terminating the Thirty Years War. Members
of fighting units were now mustered in national armies and war was no longer a
matter of personal relations between princely commanders, with the individual
soldier entering into a personal contract with his commander-although there
are still vestiges within national armies of troops being raised by a particular
nobleman65-and the individual captor no longer had any rights over his
captive. War was now a matter between sovereigns, and for a legally recognized
armed conflict to exist there had to be a hostile contention between States by
means of organized armed forces under a proper disciplinary system.66 At the
same time, the old distinction between just and unjust wars67 had disappeared,
and it had become accepted that any war conducted by a Christian prince was
clearly just,68 although both Suarez and Vitoria had reservations concerning
Spanish claims to the colonization of the new world. 69
It was not until the American Civil War that there was the first attempt to
produce a modem code for the conduct of armed forces in the field. Professor
Francis Lieber of Columbia College drew up what became, by order of
President Lincoln, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the US in the
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Field.70 These were so consistent with what were generally accepted practices
that they formed the basis for similar codes in Prussia, 1870; The Netherlands,
1871; France, 1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; Serbia, 1878; Argentina, 1881;
Great Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.71 By the Instructions:
[M]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering
for the sake of suffering or revenge . . . the unarmed citizen is to be spared in
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit ...
protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile state is the rule .... The United
States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion
and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially
those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the
contrary shall be rigorously punished.... All wanton violence committed against
persons in the invaded country ... all robbery ... or sacking, even after taking a
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such inhabitants
are prohibited under the penalty of death. . .. Crimes punishable by all penal
codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft,
burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a
hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in
all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be
preferred. "72

Despite the number of countries adopting similar codes, no agreed
international document acknowledging this existed, although it was generally
accepted that these postulates constituted principles amounting to
international customary law and, to the extent that they were not expressly
rejected by any State, especially a major military power, nor overruled by any,
treaty, they are as obligatory as any other rules of international law.
The first international agreement to be generally accepted came at the end
of the Crimean War with the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, 1856,13 This
was confined to maritime warfare, forbidding the issue of letters of marque,
stating that a blockade was only legal if effective, and granting immunity from
capture to enemy goods on neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships,
unless they constituted contraband. Of more general significance was the 1864
Geneva Convention on wounded in the field, already mentioned, which
recognized the distinctiveness and immunity of the Red Cross and of personnel
wearing this insignia. This Convention was amended and revised in a series of
Geneva Conferences extending from 1886 to 1977, with the Conventions of
1949, as added to by the 1977 Protocols, constituting the current body of
humanitarian law governing the treatment and protection of those hors de
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combat, civilians and other noncombatants. This body of law is known as the
Geneva Law.74
In addition to the work done on behalf of those hors de combat, efforts were
taking place to control the means of conducting warfare. The Russians had
invented a bullet which exploded on contact, and in 1867 called a conference
resulting in the Declaration of St. Petersburg. This forbade the use of
projectiles weighing less than 400 grammes that were explosive or charged with
fulminating or inflammable substances. The Declaration was of general
application, applying equally to land and sea warfare. However, its impact was
limited since it contained an all'participation clause, rendering it inapplicable
in any war in which any belligerent was not a party.
Perhaps more significant than the Declaration, was the accompanying
Preamble, which is important to the present day:
[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war; the only legitimate objective which states should
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy; for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men; this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; the
employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity.75

This document may be considered the precursor of what is now known as the
Hague Law, concerned with the means and methods of conducting operations
during armed conflict, which had its origin in a conference called by the Czar in
1874. The Brussels Protocol aimed at revising "the general usages of war,
whether with the object of defining them with greater precision, or with the
view of laying down, by a common agreement, certain limits which will
restrain, as far as possible, the severities of war." To this end a Project of an
International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War was
drafted in the hope tbat "war being thus regulated would involve less suffering,
would be less liable to those aggravations produced by uncertainty, unforeseen
events, and the passions created by the struggle; it would tend more surely to
that which should be its final object, viz., the re-establishment of good
relations, and a more solid and lasting peace between the belligerent States. "76
The Project failed for lack of ratifications, but it formed the basis on which
L'Institut de Droit International drew up its Oxford Manual of the Laws of War
on Land. According to the Preface:
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[I]ndependently of the international laws existing on this subject, there are
certain principles of justice which guide the public conscience, which are
manifested even by general customs, but which it would be well to fix and make
obligatory ... [but since it] might be premature or at least very difficult [to obtain
a treaty, the Manual could serve as the basis for national legislation, as being] in
accord with both the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized
armies. Rash and extreme rules will not be found therein. 77 The Institut has not
sought innovations in drawing up the Manual; it has contented itself with stating
clearly and codifying the accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared
allowable and practicable."78

Appreciating the pressures imposed upon the fighting man and the civilian
when there is an actual combat, the Institute called upon States to disseminate
the rules among its entire population.
The Brussels Project and the Oxford Manual, served to inspire the Czar to
call a Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899. This conference adopted a
number of Declarations together with a Convention (which was amended in
1907) that still constitute the basic law in bello. Recognizing the arrival of a
potentially new means of attack, the Conference adopted a Declaration against
the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or other similar
methods. This was replaced in 1907 and remains the only existing
international agreement on aerial warfare. Further Declarations ban
projectiles, the only use of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious
gases, as well as the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human
body.79
Most important of the instruments adopted at The Hague is Convention II
of 1899, now IV of 1907, to which is attached a set of Regulations still
constituting the basic statement of the law of warfare on land-although its
principles are now regarded as so fundamental as to amount to customary law
relevant in all theaters. It is, of course, impossible to cover all eventualities or
provide for unforeseen developments. For this reason, the parties adopted the
Martens Clause:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued [, and it never
has' ], the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases
not included in the [annexed] Regulations, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.8o
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This, in somewhat slightly amended form, appears in virtually every subsequent
agreement concerning humanitarian law in armed conflict.
At the 1907 Conference, further Conventions, covering the opening of
hostilities, naval warfare, and the rights and duties of neutrals, were adopted.81
Since each of these contains an all'participation clause, the Martens Clause,
with its clear references to chivalry, humanitarianism and accepted usages,
assumes increased importance. In addition, to the extent that any of the
provisions in the Regulations, Conventions or Declarations are now
considered to be declaratory of,82 or having developed into, customary law,
they will be applicable universally and the wording of the Convention will be
treated as expressing that law.83
Hague Convention IV makes no provision for personal liability in the event
of its breach, but Article 3 provides that "a belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces." While this is the first "black letter" acknowledgment
of the enforceability of any of the laws of war, it is merely an affirmation of the
general principle relating to the liability of a State for breach of treaty or for its
tortious wrongs or acts of its subordinates. Prior to the establishment of the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal in 1945,84 the only way of
proceeding against individual offenders was by national tribunals85 applying
customary law,86 the Regulations,87 or, in the case of their own personnel, the
national military or criminal code.88 Since Nuremherg, nearly all trials89 for
offenses against the laws of war have made reference to the principles
stemming from the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.90
Probably, the most important provision of the 1907 Regulations is Article 1
defining the scope of application of the Regulations-armies, militia units, and
volunteer forces, provided they are commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates, have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry
their arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. This purview of relevant personnel has been widened
somewhat by Protocol I of 1977. However, from the point of view of the serving
soldier, Articles 22 and 23, limiting the means of waging war and the use of
forbidden weapons (although it may well be difficult for him to know whether a
particular weapon issued to him is in fact forbidden), as well as forbidding the
imposition of unnecessary suffering, are those most likely to result in personal
liability. Even since the adoption of the Protocols, this is still largely the case.
While no Conference has been called since 1907 to revise or update the
general laws and customs of war, there have been conventions directed to
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specific issues, the protection of cultural property in armed conflict,91 the
prohibition of military or other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques,92 the use of conventional weapons,93 the production, stockpiling
and use of chemical weapons,94 and, most importantly, the conference that led
to the adoption of Protocols I and II in 1977.
In so far as maritime warfare is concerned, in addition to the Hague
Conventions already mentioned, one of which, Convention XII, sought
unsuccessfully to set up an International' Prize Court, the Declaration of
London of 1909,95 is important. The Declaration stated that it contained
"agreed rules" on blockade, contraband, unneutral service, enemy character,
convoy, and resistance to search. Though unratified, its substance was in
accord with generally recognized principles and, by and large, was observed
during World War 1;96 as recently as 1960, an Egyptian Prize Court, citing the
Declaration, condemned cargo from Israel on a Greek ship seeking to traverse
the Suez Canal.97
Other agreements relating to sea warfare, specifically submarines and
noxious gases,9B were adopted in London in 1922, but never came into force,
although the provisions on submarine warfare were confirmed by the London
Protocol of 1936. Pursuant to the Protocol, in their operations against
merchant ships, submarines are required to conform to the same rules as
surface vessels.
In particular, except in the case of persistent-' refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is in
a position to take them on board. 99

World War II practice shows that this rule was more observed in the breach
than observance.
Although the parties at The Hague dealt with projectiles from balloons, they
did not appreciate the potential importance of air warfare. Experience in
World War I indicated that this was an area which should not be ignored, and
in 1923 a Conference of Experts drew up agreed Rules of Air Warfare. 1oo These
Rules, however, have never come into force, although they are generally
regarded as having had sufficient influence for it to be said that "to a great
extent, they correspond to the customary rules and ge~eral principles

57

The Law of War
underlying the conventions on the law of war on land and at sea. nlOI This view
was accepted by the Tokyo District Court when considering the legality of the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot directly be called positive law, since they
have not become effective as authoritative with regard to air warfare. However,
international jurists regard the Draft Rules as authoritative with regard to air
warfare. Some countries regard the substance of the Rules as a standard of action
by armed forces, and the fundamental provisions of the Draft Rules are
consistently in conformity with international law regulations, and customs at
that time [1945].102

While the United States Department of the Air Force does not recognize
the Code as customary law, it does in fact often draw attention to the
compatibility of its own rules with those adopted in 1923. 103 Moreover, to the
extent that these Rules may be declaratory ofgeneral customary law, they apply
to air warfare, and by Protocol I the rules concerning the general protection of
the civilian population "apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect
the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They
further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on
land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict at sea or in the air. nlO4
Although the use of poison has been condemned since classical times,
poison gas was used during World War I. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was adopted. lOS Many countries
contend that this does not extend to non,fatallachrymose or nerve gases, while
others reserve the right to use it, for example, to suppress riots in
prisoner,of,war camps. Others state they will only apply it as between
themselves and belligerents who have also ratified the Protocol, and yet others
claim the right to use gas against a belligerent who has employed it against their
forces or xhose of their allies. While there are reports that gas and other
chemical weapons were used by Italy against Ethiopia, by Iraq against Kurdish
rebels, and, perhaps during the Gulf War, it is likely that the Protocol would
now be regarded as declaratory of customary law, at least so far as first use is
concerned. Moreover, as recently as 1993, a further Convention sought to
extend the Protocol so as to ban the manufacture, stockpiling, or use of any
chemical weapons. 106
Experience in World War II made it clear that the law as it existed in 1939
was no longer adequate, even though, as pointed out by the Nuremberg
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Tribunal, the rules embodied in Hague Convention N and the annexed
Regulations "were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war," and as such applicable to all
belligerents, whether party to that instrument or not. The same view was taken
of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to Prisoners of War,107 a finding
that was particularly important since neither the Soviet Union108 nor Japan was
a party thereto, although Japan stated it would abide by its provisions;l09
Germany contended that it did not apply to protect Soviet prisoners.
Perhaps the most significant development in the law of war to result from
World War II was the promulgation of the London Charter establishing the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,l1O with jurisdiction over crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. To the extent that it
was merely exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with the Charter, the
Tribunal was not itself creating any law. While not directly concerned with
regulating the conduct of hostilities, perhaps the major innovation was the
holding by the Tribunal that a war of aggression or in breach of treaty was a
crime, though criticism may be directed at the manner in which the Tribunal
concluded that the Pact of Paris, III whereby the parties renounced war as an
instrument of national policy, had made resort to "aggressive" war an
international crime; for the Tribunal, it was "not only an international crime: it
is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that
it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."m Surprisingly,
however, none of the accused found guilty of this "supreme" crime, but not
additional "lesser" war crimes, was sentenced to death.
As to war crimes in the traditional sense of that term, the Tribunal added
little except to hold that status of the accused, even as head of state or
commander in chief, would not provide immunity from prosecution, and
confirm that superior orders was not a defense to a war crimes charge, but could
be pleaded in mitigation. The other innovation was the concept of crimes
against humanity. This offense related to breaches of the law against civilians,
even those of the same nationality as the perpetrator. While there has been a
tendency to assume that this was a major development of a general character, it
should not be forgotten that, as defined in both the Charter and the Judgment,
crimes against humanity were committed only if they were part and parcel of
the war of aggression or of war crimes. Moreover, strictly speaking, once the
Tribunal was functus officio, this concept should have become of less
significance. l13 However, with the development of the law concerning human
rights and humanitarian law, and in an attempt to create a system for
prosecuting crimes committed in a noninternational conflict, the application
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of the concept was widened. Perhaps the most significant statement to this
effect is to be found in the Interim Report of the Commission established to
investigate crimes committed during the civil war in Rwanda:
If the normative content of "crimes against humanity" had remained frozen in its
Nuremberg form, then it could not possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda ...
because there was not a "war" in the classic sense of an inter,State or
i.nternational armed conflict.
However, the normative content of "crimes against humanity"-originally
employed by the Nuremberg tribunal for its own specific purposes in connection
with the Second World War-has undergone a substantial evolution....
"[C]rimes against humanity" finds its very origins in "principles of humanity"
first invoked in the early 1800s by a State to denounce another State's human
rights violations of its own citizens. Thus, "crimes against humanity" as a
juridical concept was conceived early on to apply to individuals regardless as to
whether or not the criminal act was perpetrated during a state of armed conflict
or not and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. The content
and legal status of the norm since Nuremberg has been broadened and expanded
through certain international human rights instruments adopted by the United
Nations since 1945....
The Commission of Experts on Rwanda considers 1l4 that "crimes against
humanity" are gross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human
rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict as
part of an official policy based on discrimination against an identifiable group of
persons, irrespective of war and the nationality of the victims. ll5

It should be pointed out here that many commentators would today question
whether such crimes need to be the consequence of a determined policy based
on discrimination.
Just as it would now be considered as part of the law that crimes against
humanity are not confined to an international armed conflict, so we find that
the 1948 Genocide Convention, which deals with acts directed at the
destruction of a defined group qua group, expressly states in Article 1 that
"genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law.,,116 There should, therefore, be no difficulty in
applying this ConventioI,l in any conflict, whether international or
noninternational, when the acts condemned are directed at a defined group
with the intention of destroying its group characteristics. Since most crimes
against humanity, as defined in the London Charter or international
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agreements on human rights, do not normally amount to offenses as grave as
genocide, it should be possible in the future to charge those responsible for
genocide with crimes against humanity, without having to prove "intent" for
genocide is clearly the gravest of all crimes against humanity.
The General Assembly adopted a resolution Affirming the Principles of
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg T ribunal.l17 As
a General Assembly resolution, it lacks any strict legal force, although it
embodies great political and moral authority. This authority has been
enhanced by the International Law Commission's enunciation of Principles of
International Law recognized by the Charter and Judgment.us Principle I
affirmed the personal liability of anyone committing a crime under
international law; Principle II provides that the failure of national law to
condemn a particular act does not remove personal liability for that act under
international law; Principle III prohibits a head of state from claiming
immunity from international criminal liability; Principle IV holds that superior
orders cannot be pleaded when a moral choice was open to an accused;
Principle V entitles war criminals to a fair trial; Principle VI confirms the
criminality of the acts condemned in the London Charter; and Principle VII
reaffirms the Tribunal's finding that complicity in any of these acts is itself a
crime. These Principles have been reaffirmed by the Commission in its Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.u9
From the point of view of the law in bello, the most important development
after 1945 was the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949.
Conventions I, II, and III, 120-addressing the wounded and sick on land and at
sea, as well as prisoners of war-are little more than reaffirmations and
extensions of the 1929 Conventions, with amendments directed at filling
lacunae, which became apparent during World War II. More innovative was
Convention IV concerning the protection of civilians in time of war,
particularly in occupied territory,121 an issue which had become of supreme
concern in the light of German practice in occupied Europe.
Further, since 1945 it had become obvious that many or most of the conflicts
that had occurred or were likely in the foreseeable future were not
international conflicts in the normal inter,State sense, but rebellions,
revolutions, or struggles for national independence. It is for this reason that the
Conventions replace the term "war," with its inter,State connotation, by
"armed conflict" and "enemy" by "adverse party"-although the mind boggles
at the idea of an infantry sergeant saying, "Hold your fire until you see the white
of the adverse party's eyes!" In such conflicts, ideological differences frequently
result in atrocities far more outrageous than any of those normally inherent in
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an international conflict. In view of this, each of the Conventions has, as its
Article 3, what may be regarded as a minimal code of humanitarian law to be
followed "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." In addition,
each contains a definition of those breaches of the Convention which are
considered "grave," and which are declared to be criminally punishable, 122
Parties agree to amend their legal systems to ensure the punishment of such
offenses. However, the relevant article never refers to the provisions of Article
3 common to the Conventions. But, if this Article is to have any meaning, it
follows that disregard of the provisions therein embodied must be enforceable;
thus, offenders must be punishable. Moreover, the offenses listed in the
Conventions, regardless of the specific Article concerned, are, for the most
part, offenses which would amount to crimes against humanity and be
punishable as such. The listing of particular offenses as "grave breaches" does
not remove the criminal character from other acts which would amount to war
crimes.
Adoption of the Civilians Convention in 1949 was still not regarded as
sufficient to satisfy the purpose for which it was promulgated. Therefore, in
1968, the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran adopted a
Resolution calling for Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 123
although none of its Resolutions carries legal force. However, they introduced
a new idea to the effect that those engaged in "struggles" against "minority
racist or colonial regimes" should not be treated as traitors but as prisoners of
war or political prisoners. This added to the impact of the General Assembly's
resolution124 confirming the assertion of the 1965 Conference of the Red Cross
on the Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers ofIndiscriminate
Warfare:
(i) the right of parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited;
(ii) it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population, as such;

(iii) distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be
spared as much as possible.125

Carrying the proposals further, the Institute of International Law, at its
Edinburgh Conference of 1969, adopted a Resolution on the distinction
between military and nonmilitary objects, particularly the problems associated
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with weapons of mass destruction. 126 In view of the status of the Institute, its
views cannot be ignored, even though the United States "does not accept them
as an accurate statement of internationallaw relating to armed conflict ...
[but] regard[s] as declaratory of existing customary law ... [the] general
principles recognized [and] unanimously adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly."127 However, bearing in mind the importance of opinio juris,
some reference to the Institute's views must be made.
First, the Institute made reference to the "consequences which the
indiscriminate conduct of hostilities and particularly the use of nuclear,
chemical and bacteriological weapons, may involve for civilians and for
mankind as a whole ... [and went on to enunciate] the principles to be
observed in armed conflicts by any de jure or de facto government, or by any
other authOrity responsible for the conduct of hostilities." 128 It emphasized that
the distinction between military and nonmilitary objectives, as well as between
combatants and civilians, must be constantly preserved; that neither the
civilian population nor specially agreed protected establishments may ever be
regarded as military objectives, nor "under any circumstances" may the means
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population or those which serve
primarily humanitarian purposes; that all existing protective principles of
international armed conflict law must be preserved and observed; and that
[E]xisting intemationallaw prohibits, irrespective of the type of weapon used,
any action whatsoever designed to terrorize the civilian population.... [and]
prohibits the use of all weapons which, by their nature, affect indiscriminately
both military objectives and non-military objects, or both armed forces and
civilian populations. In particular, it prohibits the use of weapons the destructive
effect of which is so great that it cannot be limited to specific military objectives
or is othenvise uncontrollable (self-generating weapons), as well as "blind"
weapons. [It also] prohibits all attacks for whatsoever motives or by whatsoever
means for the annihilation of any group, region or urban centre with no possible
distinction between armed forces and civilian populations or between military
and non-military objectives. 129

The General Assembly subsequently adopted a Resolution which broadly
accepted the principles laid down by the Institute. However, it went somewhat
further, in that, while affirming the principles for the protection of civilians, it
asserted that "fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and
laid down in international agreements, continue to apply fully in situations of
armed conflict.,,130 This appears to be a new departure from previous
understanding, for it would normally be thought that as lex specialis the Hague
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and Geneva Law overrode the lex generalis of human rights instruments which
might be considered applicable in peacetime, especially as these latter
instruments usually recognize that most, but not all, of their provisions are
derogable in time of emergency, including armed conflict. l31
Since this Resolution was adopted without any opposition, it might be
assumed that the members of the international community thought that the
principles therein enunciated amounted to an expression of customary law,
which would render the United States reservations concerning the Institute's
proposals of less significance than they appear at first glance.
There followed the adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and their Destruction in 1972,132 but this was silent as to use.
Difficulties arose in relation to chemical weapons and a further, as yet
unratified, Convention was adopted in 1993 directed against the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
their Destruction. 133
All these proposals with regard to the means and methods of warfare led the
International Committee of the Red Cross to propose amendments to the 1949
Conventions in an effort to meet some of the concerns now apparent. The
Conference that ensued met from 1974 to 1977 and produced two Protocols
supplementing, but not in any way replacing, the 1949 Conventions-Ion
international and II on noninternational armed conflicts. 134
Apart from bringing the law up to date, Protocol I makes fundamental
changes in the existing law regulating international armed conflicts and, while
formally concerned with humanitarian law as propounded in the Geneva law,
does in fact add to some of the Hague law concerning means and methods.
Most importantly, recognizing the principles of political correctness and
concerns regarding self,determination, it provides that struggles conducted by
national liberation movements in the name of self,determination are to be
considered international conflicts and thus subject to the intemationallaw of
armed conflict. 135 It also changes the definition of combatants on behalf of the
members of such movements, even though they are not wearing recognized
uniforms nor carrying their arms openly save when actually engaged and visible
to the adversary while preparing to engage. 136 The Protocol extends the
protection given to civilian and nonmilitary objects and forbids actions likely to
have a deleterious effect upon civilians. Thus, it forbids attacks upon narrowly
defined "dangerous installations"-dams, dykes and nuclear electrical
generating stations. Changing long,recognized law, it defines mercenaries and
denies them prisoner of war status. It widens the concept of grave breaches as
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defined in the Conventions, and recognizes civil defense as a matter requiring
separate acknowledgment. In an effort to make the law clearly understood, it
requires legal advisers to be attached to military units, without specifying the
level of attachment, and expressly confirms the principle of command
responsibility, including the obligation of a commander to ensure compliance
with the law by his subordinates by imposing a duty to suppress, repress and
punish offenders.
The Protocol reflects many of the principles adopted by the Institute at its
Edinburgh meeting, but ignores completely any reference to weapons of mass
destruction other than by implication when forbidding long, term damage to
the environment or insisting on the preservation of material essential to the
sustenance of the civilian population. The reason put forward for ignoring the
problems of the nuclear weapon was that this was essentially an issue of
disarmament rather than humanitarian law. Nevertheless, when the General
Assembly subsequently asked the World Court for an advisory opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNudear Weapons, 137 the Court found itself unable
to give a direct answer, though it had some difficulty in leaving the issue
completely open.
The Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope, nor a
customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per
se, it will now deal with the question whether recourse to nuclear weapons must
be considered as illegal in the light of the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict....
[The] two branches of law applicable in armed conflict [-the Hague and
Geneva law-] have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to
have gradually formed one complex system, known today as international
humanitarian law....
Since the tum of the century, the appearance of new means of combat
has-without calling into question the long-standing principles and rules of
international law-rendered necessary some specific prohibitions of the use of
certain weapons ....
The cardinal principles constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are [as
follows]. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and
non-combatants. States must never make civilians the object of attack and must
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between
civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to
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cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use
weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.
[Accordingly,] States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the
weapons they use.
The Court would refer, in relation to these principles, to the Martens Clause ...
which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of
niilitary technology. A modem version ... is to be found in Additional Protocol I
of 1977Ys
In conformity with the aforementioned principles, humanitarian law, at a very
early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because of their
indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of unnecessary
suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm greater than that
unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. If an envisaged use of
weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to
engage in such use would also be contrary to that law.... [T]hese fundamental
rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible
principles ofintemational customary law [-1 jus cogens-] . ...
Turning now to the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law
to a possible threat or use of nuclear weapons ....
The Court shares th[e] view [that] there can be no doubt as to the applicability
of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons .... Indeed, nuclear weapons were
invented after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and
1974,1977 [which drew up the Conventions and Protocols] left these weapons
aside, and there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference between
nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded
from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable
in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be
incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles
in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all
forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the
present and those of the future ....
Finally, the Court points to the Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and
applicability is not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules
of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons....
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Although the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law ... to
nuclear weapons is hardly disputed, the conclusions to be drawn from this
applicability are ... controversial. ...
[N] one of the States advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under
certain circumstances, including the "clean" use of nuclear, low yield, tactical
nuclear weapons [-which, in view of their radio-activity, would still be likely to
cause "unnecessary" suffering to combatant victims-] has indicated what,
supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances
justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into
the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons [-is this comment of legal
significance?-]. This being so, the Court does not consider that it has a
sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view.
Nor can the Court make a determination upon the validity of the view that the
recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their
inherent and total incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict.
Certainly, ... the principles and rules oflaw applicable in armed conflict-at the
heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity-make the conduct
of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus, methods
and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian
and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to
combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons ... the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with
respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not
have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of
law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstances.
Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. 139 Nor can it ignore the
practice referred to as the "policy of deterrence" [-a legal issue for a
Court?-], to which an appreciable section of the international community
adhered for many years ....
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole ...
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very
survival would be at stake.... 140
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As if aware of the somewhat unsatisfactory nature of its answers, the Court
referred to the varying views that exist at present on this matter and called for
an early conference to settle the entire issue oflegality, reminding the members
of the international community of their obligation to negotiate in good faith.
Having thus seen the Court's comments on the legality of the nuclear
weapon and its reference to the absence of mention in the Conventions or
Protocol I, it is perhaps in order to consider the significance of this instrument.
Although both Protocols constitute an annex to the Conventions, they do not
automatically become part thereof and, as such, binding upon Convention
parties. Ratification or accession remains necessary, and there is much debate
as to the extent to which the provisions in Protocol I are declaratory of
customary law relevant to international conflicts and therefore binding
regardless of accession. Perhaps it is sufficient in this connection to refer to the
Report submitted by General Colin Powell to the Defense Department of the
United States in regard to the Gulf War of 1991 in which the Coalition forces
were under his overall command. Many of the combatants in this conflict,
including both Iraq and the United States, had failed to ratify or accede.
Nevertheless, Powell pointed out that to the greatest extent feasible, the
limitations imposed by Protocol I were observed and that "decisions were
impacted by legal considerations at every level. ... [T]he law of war proved
invaluable in the decision,making process" in regard to action taken. H1 By way
of contrast, Protocol II, as the first international effort to regulate such a
domestic matter as a noninternational conflict, is clearly innovative.
Even though there has, as yet, been no instrument regulating the legality of
the use of nuclear weapons, there has been some progress with regard to
conventional weapons, that is to say those not of massive destruction potential,
although they may in fact be indiscriminatory. Thus, in 1980, a Convention
was adopted on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or
Have Indiscriminatory Effects. Hz This comprised three Protocols. The first
prohibits weapons "the primary purpose of which is to injure by fragments
which in the human body escape detection by X,rays," although it is not
believed any such exist or are likely to be invented in the foreseeable future.
Protocol II is concerned with land mines, booby traps and other similar devices,
its main aim being to protect civilians from such weapons, while at the same
time preventing their use against troops in a perfidious manner, as would be the
case if they were used in connection with protective emblems or, for example,
corpses. Finally, Protocol III prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons
if fire is the primary rather than incidental or consequential outcome. While
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incendiaries have become of less significance with the increased resort to
mechanized warfare, particularly when long,distance (as compared with
trench or house,to,house combat), incendiaries remain significant when used
against armored vehicles or aircraft. Consequently, the Protocol excludes from
its purview.
(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as luminants,
tracers, smoke or signaling systems;

(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects
with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour'piercing projectiles,
fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined,effects munitions in
which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause bum injury to
persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles,
aircraft and installations or facilities.143

This last sub, paragraph leaves one with the impression that the draftsmen were
of opinion that "armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities" exist
in themselves, without any human being required to make them militarily
effective.
In 1995, a fourth Protocol was added to these three to control the use of
Blinding Laser Weapons. As with incendiaries, the ban is only directed at the
employment of:
[L]aser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision,
that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices....
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military
employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical
equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol. l44

Interestingly, this would seem to remove one of the considerations normally
applicable when construing whether an offense has been committed against
the law of war amounting to a war crime. In most cases, it is now accepted that
if an illegal consequence amounting to a breach was "foreseeable or considered
likely," liability would follow. In this case, however, even though it is very likely
that in using laser weapons against optical equipment blindness may well
ensue, such use is not considered to amount to illegality, even though it is
known that this is likely to be the case.
It was pointed out earlier that most of the provisions of the law of war are
only applicable in the event of an international armed conflict, including such
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conflicts as may be considered to be on behalf of self~determination, and that
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions does not really carry this
much further, unless one is able to argue that breach of the various provisions
in that Article amounts to crimes against humanity. The 1977 Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Conventions sought to provide some measure of
humanitarian principles into noninternational conflicts. However, the
threshold for this Protocol to come into effect is so high that it would exclude
almost every noninternational conflict other than one which amounts to a civil
war with the antigovernment forces in effective control of some part of the
national territory, a requirement which is not imposed in the case of a war for
national liberation:
Art. 1 (1) This Protocol ... shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
[elevated by Protocol I into international conflicts] which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol. 145
As if to emphasize this high threshold and to make it clear that there is no
undue interference with national sovereignty and the power of a government
to deal with opposition and affirm its right to maintain order, the Article
expressly declares that the "Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence
and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts,"146 and, as we
have just seen, nor would it apply, even if the armed incidents were far more
extensive and serious, if those opposing the go:vernment were not in control
over part of the national territory. Further limiting the possible impact of the
Protocol on the conflict, Article 2 makes clear that the Protocol cannot:
[B] e invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or
re~establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and
territorial integrity of the State ... [nor] as a justification for intervening, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or
external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that
conflict occurs.147
While the Protocol makes no attempt to suggest that the decision as to
"legitimate" means of restoring order belongs to any authority other than the
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government concerned, it cannot, despite the ban on intervention, inhibit the
Security Council from deciding, as it has in the case of the former Yugoslavia
and of Rwanda, that the situation is so grievous that it amounts to a threat to
international peace warranting action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and
authorizing action despite the traditional reservations concerning
nonintervention in domestic affairs.
The cheapest and most easily accessible weapon available to those involved
in a noninternational conflict, especially those confronting the governmental
forces, are mines and booby traps, but the 1980 Protocol relevant thereto only
applies in an international armed conflict. However, since mines and booby
traps are so easily made, are relatively inexpensive, and cause extensive injury
to civilians even after the conflict has terminated, when the Convention on
Conventional Weapons was amended in 1993, Protocol II on mines was also
amended.148 By virtue of this amendment, the Protocol was extended to
situations mentioned in Article 3 common to the four Conventions, that is to
say to noninternational conflicts-although the reservation with regard to
riots and the like was preserved, leaving it open to both combatants in such a
situation to behave as indiscriminately in this regard as might please them.
While the ban is applicable to all parties, the reservations with regard to
sovereignty are also preserved. In an effort to reduce the dangers to civilians,
particularly after the end of hostilities, the amended Protocol contains
carefully spelled,out regulations concerning the marking and identification of
mined areas as well as provision for their ultimate removal. The Protocol does
not ban the use of all mines, but only those which are strictly anti,personnel
and which lack self,destructive, self,neutralizing, or self, deactivating
mechanisms or are fitted with an anti, handling device. While it seeks to limit
the use of these mines, the Protocol does not make the obtaining of such
weaponry illegal, nor forbid their manufacture or supply to those seeking them.
In fact, those countries which are capable of the mass production of mines
tend, at present, to be opposed to any international agreement which will limit
their right to manufacture or use, especially in circumstances of self,defense,
even though they express willingness not to supply them to those countries
seeking them on the international market.
This historical introduction to the law of armed conflict has paid most
attention to warfare upon land since this is the region for which most
agreements have been designed, while the earliest beginnings of regulation
were directed to land warfare. Where it has been considered essential, specific
reference has been made to both aerial and naval warfare, especially since the
principles underlying the laws and customs of warfare on land are general in
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character and equally applicable, to the extent that is practicable, to operations
at sea and in the air as well. Equally, nothing has been said about neutrality.
This is partly due to the fact that in modem war there are few neutrals,
particularly when the States which are neutral are weaker than the belligerents
and therefore have difficulty in asserting their rights against those of the latter.
Moreover, since virtually all States are members of the United Nations and
thus bound to carry out any decisions of the Security Council,149 and, since no
military action is legal without Security Council consent or approval, it may be
argued that no State can any longer claim to be entitled to the rights
traditionally pertaining to neutrality. This is particularly so when operations
are undertaken to give effect to a Security Council decision, a matter that
became of some importance during the Gulf War of 1991.150
In addition to any international agreements that may be relevant, as pointed
out by the World Court in its opinion on The Threator Use of Nuclear Weapons,
the law of armed conflict is still governed by those "principles of international
law derived from established custom [-going back to feudal times and
before-]' from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience,"151 together with such considerations of proper behavior as
amount to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations 152 and, as
such, rules of international law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Further, there is nothing to prevent any
State from laying down any rules regulating the conduct of its own forces,
provided they do not run counter to any established rules and customs of the
law of armed conflict, and, as we have seen, breaches of these rules may now be
considered as amounting to crimes against humanity, and punishable as such,
whether the conflict is one that is international or noninternational in
character. Equally, since it is generally accepted that the law concerning armed
conflict is of universal interest, there is nothing to stop any individual State, as
many have in fact done, from passing legislation granting its courts jurisdiction
over breaches of this law regardless of the nationality of the offender or of the
victim. Nor is the geographic location of the offense of any significance. Finally,
as may be seen with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it is open to the Security Council, having decided that
a particular conflict, whether international or noninternational, amounts to a
potential threat to international peace, to proceed to establish special courts
with power to enforce the law and punish offenders.
In fine, perhaps it might be suggested that the time is now ripe for a further
effort to be made, perhaps under the auspices of the International Committee
of the Red Cross or the International Law Commission, to draw up a revised
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and up,to,date statement of what the laws, as distinct from the customs of war,
are. 153 If this should be considered impossible or impracticable, perhaps those
States which are of like mind, as for example is the case with the members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or those of the European Community
with the addition of the United States, would work together to draw up an
agreed upon code which will be applicable to their forces and which might
serve as an example to be adopted by others.
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